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The Challenges of Preventing and
Prosecuting Social Media Crimes
Thaddeus Hoffmeister*
Wanted: Caretaker For Farm. Simply watch over
a 688 acre patch of hilly farmland and feed a few
cows, you get 300 a week and a nice 2 bedroom
trailer, someone older and single preferred but
will consider all, relocation a must, you must
have a clean record and be trustworthy—this is a
permanent position, the farm is used mainly as a
hunting preserve, is overrun with game, has a
stocked 3 acre pond, but some beef cattle will be
kept, nearest neighbor is a mile away, the place
is secluded and beautiful, it will be a real get
away for the right person, job of a lifetime—if
you are ready to relocate please contact asap,
position will not stay open.1
This Craigslist ad was posted in 2011 by two residents of
North-Central Ohio, Brogan Rafferty (age 16 at the time) and
Richard Beasley (age 52 at the time).2 Of the four individuals
(2 from within Ohio and 2 from outside of Ohio) who came to
the farm to interview for this job posting, 3 were killed and
robbed by Rafferty and Beasley.3 The fourth victim was shot
but managed to escape and contact authorities.4 Both Rafferty
Professor of Law and editor of lawandsocialmedia.wordpress.com.
1. Hanna Rosin, Murder by Craigslist: A Serial Killer Finds a Newly
Vulnerable Class of Victims: White, Working Class Men, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14,
2013,
8:20
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/advertisement-formurder/309435/.
2. Thomas J. Sheeran, Richard Beasley, ‘Craigslist Killer,’ Sentenced to
Death,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jun.
4,
2013,
5:12
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/04/richard-beasley-craigslist-killerdeath-penalty-sentence_n_3013536.html#.
3. Id.
4. Id.
*
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and Beasley were apprehended, tried, and convicted.5 Rafferty
was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and
Beasley is currently on Ohio’s Death Row.6
For those bent on committing crimes, like Rafferty and
Beasley, social media has opened up a whole new world. It has
become the place where criminal defendants not only commit
crimes, but also organize, plan, discuss, and even boast about
their illegal activity. Numerous criminal defendants ranging
from Fortune 500 corporate officers to street level petty thieves
have used social media to facilitate their criminal conduct.
Social media has even garnered the attention of criminal
gangs.7 This in turn has led commentators to coin new phrases
and terms like “cyberbanging.”8
The adoption and use of social media by a broad spectrum
of criminal defendants has raised some significant challenges
for those tasked with crime prevention. This article will look at
those challenges through the lens of three cases involving
social media: United States v. Drew,9 United States v. Sayer,10
and United States v. Cassidy.11 However, prior to beginning
that examination, this article will briefly discuss and categorize
the various ways criminal defendants employ social media.
I.

Categorizing Criminal Activity Involving Social Media

Generally speaking, criminal defendants use social media
in one of two ways. The first method by which criminal
defendants employ social media involves relaying information
to victims,12 co-conspirators,13 or the general public.14 Conduct
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Kim Russell, Detroit Students Organize Fights Online and Then Post
Videos in Practice Called Cyber-Banging, ABC ACTION NEWS (Jan. 28, 2012,
11:37 PM), http://www.wxyz.com/news/region/detroit/detroit-public-schoolspolice-fighting-cyber-banging.
8. Id.
9. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
10. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014).
11. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
12. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449.
13. Andrew Blankstein & Kimi Yoshino, The Game’s ‘Telephone Flash
Mob’ Delayed Responses to Robberies, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2011),
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arising here is classified as Category I activity. This category
can be further subdivided into two distinct groups (A and B).
Group A consists of criminal conduct that occurs entirely online
for example bullying, harassment, or stalking.15
Group B consists of criminal activity that occurs both
online and offline.16 The previously mentioned example from
Ohio where the criminal defendants used Craigslist to lure
victims to their farm and then execute them would fall into
Group B.17
The common denominator with both groups in Category I
is that the criminal defendant uses social media to relay
information to victims, co-conspirators, or the general public.
The term relay applies to any method by which an individual
may deliver information to another via social media. This
includes such things as “liking” the social media content of
another user.18 In one case from New York, a trial court
determined that a defendant could be charged for violating a
protection order when she sent a friend request to an
individual who had a protection order against her.19 According
to the judge, the defendant’s use of social media to reach the
complainant was a form of contact just like speaking in person
or by telephone, and the order of restraint had barred any type
of contact.20
When relaying information to victims, co-defendants, or
the general public, criminal defendants use a variety of
techniques. For example, some communicate directly with the
victim on social media, while others communicate indirectly by
merely posting information on social media in a public or quasipublic place where the victims or the public can view it. For
example, in Griffin v. Maryland, a case involving the
authentication of a Myspace page, the girlfriend of the
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/08/game-rapper-twittertelephone-flash-mob-sheriff.html.
14. Sayer, 748 F.3d at 425.
15. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449.
16. Sheeran, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. Tennessee Man Arrested for Facebook Like, RT (Jan. 17, 2011),
http://rt.com/usa/man-arrested-facebook-like-790/.
19. People v. Fernino, 851 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Crim. Ct. 2008).
20. Id.
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defendant allegedly posted the following on her Myspace page
as a warning to anyone who planned to testify against her
boyfriend in his upcoming trial, “JUST REMEMBER
SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”21
Also, when relaying information to victims, co-defendants,
or the general public, some criminal defendants use their real
Others remain anonymous or create fictitious
names.22
names.23 A final group actually creates a false name or takes
on the identity of the intended victim, e.g., online
impersonation.24
The second method or category of criminal activity involves
using social media to gather information about victims.25 Like
Category I, Category II can be further subdivided into two
groups. In Group A, the criminal defendant employs the
information gathered from social media to commit modern
crimes that many associate with the Internet, e.g., identity
theft.26 In Group B, the criminal defendant uses information
gathered from social media to commit traditional crimes such
as burglary.27
When using social media for Category II crimes, criminal
defendants look for all types of personal identifiable
information about victims ranging from photos to birthdates to
names of friends. According to Frank Abagnale, a former con
man turned FBI officer (portrayed in the 2002 film Catch Me If
21. Griffin v. Maryland, 995 A.2d 791, 795 (Md. 2011).
22. United States v. Elonis, No. 11-00013, 2011 WL 5024284 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 20, 2011).
23. A.B. v. Indiana, 863 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), vacated, 885
N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2008); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d
502 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
24. Tina Susman, Facebook Identity Theft: Probation Deal for Woman
Who
Trashed
Ex?,
LA
TIMES
(Mar.
20,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/20/nation/la-na-nn-fake-facebook20120320.
25. Facebook ID Theft Targets “Friends”, NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2009),
http://bob-sullivan.newsvine.com/_news/2009/01/30/2375283-facebook-idtheft-targets-friends.
26. Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/technology/17privacy.html?_r=0.
27. Kim Komando, Burglars Use Social Media to Target Homes, USA
TODAY
(Jan.
3,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/komando/2014/01/03/socialmedia-identity-theft-home-videos/4248601/.
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You Can), “[i]f you tell me your date of birth and where you’re
born [on Facebook], I’m 98% [of the way] to stealing your
identity.”28
To obtain certain personal information, criminal
defendants must monitor social media over a period of time.29
This is especially true if the criminal defendant wants to learn
the physical whereabouts or daily routine of the victim.30
Currently, the vast majority of social media related
criminal activity occurs in Category I, i.e., relaying information
to others. Thus, this essay will focus on this category. It
should be noted, however, that sometimes the defendant’s
criminal conduct falls into both Categories I and II or cuts
across multiple groups.
II. United States v. Lori Drew
In United States v. Lori Drew, the defendant, a 49-year-old
mother from Missouri, created a MySpace page with the
picture of an attractive fictitious 16-year-old boy named Josh
Evans.31 The picture used for the MySpace page was of a real
person, however, the name and information attached to the
picture were entirely fake.32 Lori Drew created this account to
befriend 13-year-old Megan Meier, a one-time friend and
classmate of Drew’s daughter.33 Lori Drew believed that this
bogus MySpace account would allow her to learn whether
Megan Meier was spreading rumors about her daughter.34
Acting as Josh Evans, Lori Drew would flirt with Megan

28. Mark Sweney, Facebook Users Risk Identity Theft, Says Famous ExConman,
GUARDIAN
(London),
(Mar.
20,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/mar/20/facebook-risks-identitytheft-frank-abagnale.
29. Simon Tomlinson, How’s Your Social Security? Burglars Monitor
Facebook and Twitter to See When You’re Away from Home, DAILY MAIL (Nov.
1, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2056079/Hows-socialsecurity-Burglars-monitor-Facebook-Twitter-youre-away-home.html.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Meier on MySpace.35 The relationship eventually turned sour
and Lori Drew, through Josh Evans, told Megan Meier that the
world would be a better place without her.36 Shortly thereafter,
Megan Meier, believing she had been rejected by Josh Evans
committed suicide in her closet bedroom.37
The federal government relying on the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA) charged Lori Drew with three felony
counts of accessing protected computers without authorization
to obtain information.38 At the time, the CFAA appeared to be
the best federal statute to address Lori Drew’s conduct. The
U.S. attorney from the Central District of California handled
the prosecution because the MySpace servers were physically
located in California. Missouri passed on the opportunity to
prosecute because at the time the state’s harassment statute
did not address Lori Drew’s conduct.39
Under the government’s theory of prosecution, Lori Drew
violated the CFAA because she had entered into a contract or
Terms of Service (TOS) agreement with MySpace in order to
create Josh Evans’s account.40 Most social media providers
require users to enter into a TOS established by the social
media provider prior to setting up an account.41 Pursuant to
the MySpace TOS, Lori Drew was required to provide accurate
and truthful information when registering for the account and
refrain from using any information obtained from MySpace
services to harass, abuse, or harm other people.42
Lori Drew allegedly violated this TOS when she (1) created
the bogus Josh Evans account and (2) used the account to
harass Megan Meier.43 Thus, Lori Drew’s communication with
Megan Meier through MySpace’s protected servers was without
authorization or in excess of authorized access at least
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2012) (emphasis added).
39. Joel Currier & David Hunn, Neighbor’s Story Emerges in Suicide;
Prosecutor Finds Insufficient Evidence to Charge Anyone in MySpace Case,
ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 2007, at A1.
40. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464-68.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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according to the prosecution.44
Although the jury found Lori Drew guilty, it rejected the
prosecution’s theory that Lori Drew intended to harm Megan
Meier, a required finding for a felony conviction under the
CFAA.45 As a result, the jury only convicted Lori Drew of three
These convictions were later
misdemeanor counts.46
overturned by the trial judge on vagueness grounds.47 The trial
judge determined that the CFAA as applied in the Drew case
failed to give the defendant notice that breach of a website’s
TOS in and of itself could constitute a crime.48 In addition, the
judge found that such application provided insufficient
guidelines to law enforcement as they attempt to enforce the
law.49
While Lori Drew’s conduct was universally condemned
across the country, many felt uncomfortable with her
prosecution under the CFAA.50 The concern over the case was
not necessarily for Lori Drew but what her case meant for
future defendants. Had the government succeeded in its
prosecution of Lori Drew, then arguably anyone could be
prosecuted for violating a TOS. Thus, lying on Myspace or
LinkedIn about academic or professional credentials in order to
impress some reader could lead to criminal charges if the social
media provider’s TOS prohibited such dishonesty or fraud.
III.

United States v. Sayer

Sayer illustrates another example of online social media
impersonation; however, unlike Drew, the defendant here
impersonated the victim (his ex-girlfriend) rather than a
fictitious person.51 In Sayer, the defendant posted ads on
44. Id.
45. Id. at 451.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 449.
48. Id. at 461.
49. Id. at 467.
50. Andrew M. Grossman, The MySpace Suicide: A Case Study in
Overcriminalization,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Sep.
17,
2008),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/09/the-myspace-suicide-a-casestudy-in-overcriminalization.
51. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 2014).
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Craiglist’s Casual Encounters (a section on Craigslist for
meeting other people) that showed his ex-girlfriend in
lingerie.52 Prior to their break-up, the defendant had taken
consensual photos of the victim.53 In the ad, Sayer, posing as
his ex-girlfriend, encouraged men to come to her house.54 The
ad included the victim’s address and a list of sex acts to be
performed when the men arrived.55 As a result of the ad,
strange men would routinely appear at the victim’s house
looking for sexual encounters.56
In order to prevent random strangers from showing up at
her house, the victim moved to Louisiana.57 However, different
men again started to arrive at her new home.58 Like in the
past, these men claimed that they had met the victim online.59
Shortly thereafter, the victim discovered a sexually explicit
video of herself on several adult pornographic sites.60 As with
the earlier pictures, the victim had consented to the video prior
to her breakup with Sayer.61 The video posting included the
victim’s name as well as her new Louisiana address.62
Ultimately, Sayer was caught and successfully prosecuted for
cyber stalking and identity theft.63
With respect to the cyber stalking charge, Sayer was
convicted of violating the Federal Interstate Stalking
Punishment and Prevention Act (FISPPA).64 While the term
“Facebook Stalker” has garnered a sort of benign humorous
connotation in popular culture,65 individuals, through the
misuse of social media, have been charged and convicted of
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 429.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).
65. Byron Dubow, Confessions of ‘Facebook Stalkers’, USA TODAY (Mar.
8, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2007-0307-facebook-stalking_N.htm.
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violating FISPPA. As originally written, FISPPA prohibited a
person, who had crossed state lines, from using the mail or
commerce to put another in reasonable fear of death or serious
injury.66 In 2000, the jurisdictional hook of the statute was
changed from “travel across a State line” to “travel[] in
interstate commerce.”67 This modification turned FISPPA into
a statute that targeted both traditional and online stalking.68
The law was again expanded in 2006 to criminalize causing
substantial emotional distress to another person using an
Today, for a successful
interactive computer service.69
prosecution under FISPPA, the government must prove the
following elements:
Use of
a. The mail
b. Any
interactive
computer
service, or
c. Any facility of interstate or
foreign commerce;
To engage in a course of conduct,
defined as a pattern of conduct
composed of 2 or more acts,
evidencing a continuity of purpose;
That causes
d.
Substantial emotional distress,
or
e.
Reasonable fear of death or
serious bodily injury, to a person in
another state or tribal jurisdiction or
within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction; and
Intent by the defendant to
f.
Kill,
g.
Injure,
h.
Harass,
66.
67.
68.
69.

18 U.S.C. § 2261A Notes.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
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i.
Place under surveillance with
intent
to kill, injure, harass, or
intimidate, or
j.
Cause substantial emotional
distress to that person.70
IV. United States v. Cassidy
United States v. Cassidy, the last case to be discussed,
highlights some of the challenges that arise with FISPPA
prosecutions when the alleged stalking or harassment involves
a public figure and occurs on social media. In Cassidy, the
criminal defendant, who initially went by the alias Sanderson,
met Alyce Zeoli in 2007.71 Zeoli, an enthroned Buddhist
American tulku,72 teaches and leads the Kunzang Odsal Palyou
Changchub Choling Center (“Center”), located in Maryland.73
The meeting between Cassidy and Zeoli was facilitated by
Zeoli’s friends who believed that Cassidy was also a Buddhist
American tulku.74
After meeting and becoming fast friends with Cassidy,
Zeoli invited him to drive with her to a retreat in Arizona.75
During the trip, Cassidy proposed to Zeoli but she declined his
offer.76
He then suggested that the two pretend to be
77
married.
While on this trip, Zeoli also revealed intimate
details about her personal life to Cassidy.78
Shortly after the trip, it came to light that William
Sanderson’s real name was William Cassidy.79 Members of the
Center also began to notice that Cassidy’s conduct was
inconsistent with the sect’s teachings, e.g., he gossiped.80 Yet,

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 578 (D. Md. 2011).
Id. (A tulku is "A reincarnate master.").
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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despite certain misgivings, Cassidy was appointed to the
position of chief operating officer (COO) of the Center.81
Shortly after his appointment as COO, Zeoli learned that
Cassidy had never been a tulku.82 She confronted Cassidy
about this fact and he left the Center in February 2008.83
Subsequent to his departure, Cassidy started making
disparaging posts and tweets about Zeoli and the Center. Some
of the 8,000 tweets and blog posts were arguably threatening:
ya like haiku? Here’s one for ya: “Long, Limb,
Sharp Saw, Hard Drop” ROFLMAO.
Got a wonderful Pearl Harbor Day surprise for
KPC . . . wait for it.
Terrors in the night disturb Fat (A.Z.)’s sleep: she
cannot sleep without taking something, and
anxiety rules her body like a slavemaster.84
Other tweets and posts were critical and disparaging:
[Zeoli] is a demonic force who tries to destroy
Buddhism.
(A.Z.) you are a liar & a fraud & you corrupt
Buddhism by your very presence: go kill yourself.
(A.Z.) IS A SATANIC CORRUPTER OF
DHARMA:
A
SHE_DEMON
WHO
MASQUERADES AS A “TEACHER”85
In 2011, Cassidy was charged with violating FISPPA.86
Specifically, Cassidy was charged with the intent to harass and
cause substantial emotional distress to Zeoli in violation of
FISPPA.87 Interestingly, the government did not charge the
defendant with putting Zeoli in reasonable fear of death or

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 576.
Id.
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serious bodily injury. This is most likely due to the fact that
the posts and tweets, although disparaging, were not very
threatening.
Prior to trial, counsel for Cassidy filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the statute on its face and as applied violated
Cassidy’s First Amendment rights.88 The trial court ultimately
found the statute unconstitutional as applied to Cassidy.89
Thus, it never decided whether the statute was
unconstitutional on its face.
In dismissing the charges against Cassidy, the trial court
first determined that Cassidy’s tweets and blog posts, although
in bad taste, challenged Zeoli’s character and qualifications as
a religious leader and thus were protected under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.90 The court
pointed out that not all speech is protected, for example, speech
involving obscenity, fraud, defamation, true threats,
incitement, or speech integral to criminal conduct.91 However,
Cassidy was charged with harassing Zeoli, not with placing her
in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.
The next step in the court’s analysis was to determine
whether FISPPA as applied to Cassidy’s actions was a contentbased restriction.92 The court ultimately determined that the
statute as applied to Cassidy was a content-based restriction
because it “limits speech on the basis of whether that speech is
emotionally distressing to A.Z.”93
As a result of this determination, the court examined the
application of the FISPPA statute under the highest level of
review—strict scrutiny.94 Thus, in order for the government to
prevail against Cassidy’s motion to dismiss, it had to show a
compelling interest for the prosecution of the case, a very high
standard to meet.
The government claimed that its compelling interest arose
from the need to protect “victims from emotional distress
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 581.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id.
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sustained through an interactive computer service.”95 The
court pointed out, however, that this interest could just as
easily be protected by having the victim ignore the defendant’s
blog or block his tweets.96
The court then went on to examine whether the
government could survive the defendant’s motion to suppress
under a lower level of review—intermediate scrutiny.97
Unfortunately for the prosecution, the court again found the
government’s argument for prosecuting Cassidy under FISPPA
unconstitutional even with this lower level of scrutiny.98 Here,
the court drew a distinction between using the telephone to
harass someone and using Twitter or a blog.99 In explaining
why Virginia’s telephone harassment statute could be found
constitutional while FISPPA as applied to Cassidy could not,
the court stated, “harassing telephone calls ‘are targeted
towards a particular victim and are received outside a public
forum’. . . Twitter and Blogs are today’s equivalent of a bulletin
board that one is free to disregard, in contrast, for example, to
e-mails or phone calls directed to a victim.”100
The court’s opinion did not end with finding the
government’s interest to be lacking at both levels of scrutiny.
The court went on and assumed in arguendo that the
government had a compelling interest.101 The court still found
the indictment as applied to Cassidy unconstitutional because
FISPPA, in this case, “sweeps in the type of expression that the
Supreme Court has consistently tried to protect.”102 For
example, the statute could cover statements Cassidy made
about “KPC’s beliefs and A.Z.’s qualifications as a leader.”103
Cassidy might have resulted in a better outcome for the
government if the defendant, rather than using social media,
had employed traditional communication methods like the mail

95. Id.
96. Id. at 585.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 587.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 585.
101. Id. at 586
102. Id.
103. Id.
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or the telephone.
The court appeared troubled with
prosecuting someone for making disparaging comments about a
public figure in a public forum. The court noted “that Twitter
and Blogs are today’s equivalent of a bulletin board that one is
free to disregard, in contrast, for example, to e-mails or phone
calls directed at the victim.”104 The court went on to find that a
blog is similar to a cyberspace bulletin board.105
The government also might have survived the defendant’s
motion to dismiss by changing its theory of prosecution from
causing emotional distress to issuing true threats.106 As the
court pointed out, true threats like obscenity, fraud,
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct are not
protected speech;107 however, that was not the basis for the
government’s indictment in this case. According to the court,
“the Government did not seek an Indictment on the basis that
the Defendant intentionally used the Internet to put A.Z. in
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.”108
V. Challenges of Preventing and Prosecuting Social Media
Crimes
At present, many think that social media crimes are easier
to commit and more difficult to prevent than their offline
counterparts.109
For example, in the past, a crime like
harassment generally required a criminal defendant to interact
physically or telephonically with the victim. Furthermore,
criminal defendants were historically constrained by the
volume of their voices and the physical proximity of the victim.
Harrasers in the Digital Age do not face these same type of
impediments.
As illustrated by Sayer, harassment can now occur without
the criminal defendant ever speaking to or interacting with the

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 585-86.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at n.11.
Jacqueline D. Lipton,
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1103 (2011).
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victim.110 In fact, the criminal defendant does not even need to
leave his house to commit the crime. Nor does it matter if the
victim moves away because he or she can be easily tracked
down by their Digital Footprint.111 Also, with social media the
criminal defendant can harass the victim through third parties
who may or may not know that they are part of a criminal
enterprise.
The next section will examine some of the major challenges
that arise when attempting to prevent and prosecute social
media related criminal activity. Specifically, this section will
focus on the (1) reach of social media; (2) identification of social
media users; and (3) applicable criminal statutes.
A.

Reach of Social Media

With social media and its expansive reach (Facebook alone
has over 1.2 billion users),112 the pool of potential victims for
criminal defendants has grown exponentially. In the example
of the so-called Ohio “Craigslist Killers” the criminal
defendants were able to go beyond their own immediate
physical surroundings and find victims both inside and outside
of the state.113 One victim travelled all the way from South
Carolina in response to the job advertisement.114
By
victimizing individuals from various areas of the country, the
defendants reduced the likelihood that the victims would be
traced back to them or that their scheme would be uncovered.
The reach of social media was also seen in Sayer where, despite
moving far away, the victim was still being harassed by her ex-

110. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014).
111. Cf. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age:
One Click at a Time, 60 KAN. L. REV. 611, 627 (2012).
112. Jemima Kiss, Facebook’s 10th Birthday: From College Dorm to 1.23
Billion
Users,
GUARDIAN
(London)
(Feb.
3,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/04/facebook-10-years-markzuckerberg.
113. Hanna Rosin, Murder by Craigslist: A Serial Killer Finds a Newly
Vulnerable Class of Victims: White, Working Class Men, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14,
2013,
8:20
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/advertisement-formurder/309435/.
114. Id.
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boyfriend.115
Since criminal defendants can easily reach victims via
social media, they are more inclined to repeat their crimes. In
Sayer, the criminal defendant used Craigslist’s Casual
The
Encounters site to re-victimize his ex-girlfriend.116
criminal defendant in Cassidy made over 8,000 disparaging
blog posts and tweets about Alyce Zeoli and the Center.117
With social media, criminal defendants can harm victims
rapidly and repeatedly.
B.

Identification of Social Media Users

One of the biggest challenges with preventing and
prosecuting social media related crimes is identification of
users. This is true both for victims and law enforcement. To
date, neither social media providers nor the government has
established a cost-effective method to verify social media users.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that society wants either
the government or social media providers to have this ability.
As a result, it is not difficult for criminal defendants to remain
anonymous or impersonate others on social media. Last year,
Facebook reported that 7–8 percent of its accounts or
approximately 50 million were fictitious.118
In Drew, Megan Meier did not know that she was
communicating with a middle-aged woman and in Sayer the
men visiting Sayer’s ex-girlfriend were unaware of the fact that
it was actually Sayer posting the ads. This all raises an
interesting question of why impersonation works so well on
social media.
It appears that the success of online
impersonation hinges on social media’s ability to replicate
human interaction. Unlike traditional forms of communication
such as the mail, telephone, or television, social media comes
very close to approximating face-to-face contact. This in turn
115. Sayer, 748 F.3d at 428.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
118. Jim Edwards, Facebook Targets 76 Million Fake Users in War on
Bogus Accounts, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2013, 4:38 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-targets-76-million-fake-users-inwar-on-bogus-accounts-2013-12.
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leads users to believe that the individual at the other end of the
laptop, tablet, or smartphone is who she says she is.
Another reason online impersonations are successful is
that social media has reshaped the nature of relationships.
This started with re-defining the word “friend.” With social
media, users create friendships online with people that they do
not really know in the traditional sense; that is, most people
who use social media have not interacted with (beyond
accepting a friend request) or physically met all of their online
friends. This in turn leads to a breakdown of the traditional
social barriers that kept strangers apart. This reshaping of
human interaction has progressed to the point where
individuals have “dating” relationships completely online.
While this is more common with Digital Natives,119 see e.g.,
Mant’i Teo,120 it is not unheard of with Digital Immigrants.121
In fact, there was even a documentary film (Catfish) dedicated
to exploring these relationships.122
C. Applicable Criminal Statutes
The third major challenge to combatting social media
related crime concerns the availability of applicable criminal
statutes. In certain instances, legislators have failed to keep
pace with technological advancements. For instance, while
identity theft is a recognized crime in every state,123 the same
cannot be said for online impersonation.124 Unlike identity
theft, online impersonation, generally speaking, lacks an
economic component.
Instead, the criminal defendant
impersonates an individual for a noneconomic reason such as
119. Those born with the Internet.
120. Erik Brady & Rachel George, Manti Te’o’s “Catfish” Story Is a
Common
One,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/01/17/manti-teos-catfishstory-common/1566438/.
121. Those who immigrated to the Internet.
122. CATFISH (MTV Networks 2014).
123. Susan Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of
Criminal Law in Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 73
(2009).
124. WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-3-902 (West 2011); S. 4014, 2011, 235 Sess. (NY
2012).

17

132

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1

to harass.125 To date, few states have passed laws directly
targeting online impersonation.126
In other instances, there is a law in place but it is not
directly on point. This in turn leads some prosecutors to get
creative which, can make the problem worse. The Drew case
serves as a shining example.
In Drew, the state of Missouri declined to prosecute Lori
Drew because the Missouri criminal harassment statute did
Missouri’s harassment
not cover her specific conduct.127
statute has been modified since then.128 Missouri’s inaction led
the federal government to action. However, like the state of
Missouri, the federal government did not have a law that
directly addressed Lori Drew’s conduct. This in turn led them
to try and shoehorn the facts of the Drew case into the
CFAA,129 which created a backlash as many then saw Drew’s
prosecution as an encroachment on the constitutional rights of
society as a whole.130
Finally, there are instances where there is an available
and appropriate law in place, but when applied to social media
rather than traditional forms of communication it is deemed
unconstitutional. This is what occurred in Cassidy where the
court dismissed the government’s indictment, finding that it
infringed on the criminal defendant’s First Amendment
rights.131 A key issue in Cassidy was the method used by the
defendant to communicate his views.132 The court made note of
the fact that rather than use the phone or email to make
disparaging comments directly to the victim, the defendant
used public forums such as Twitter and blog posts.133 The court
125. SUSAN BRENNER, CYBERCRIME: CRIMINAL THREATS FROM CYBERSPACE
87 (2010).
126. Notable exceptions include California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Mississippi, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §528.5 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-45-33 (West 2011); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §33.07 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE §4.24.790 (West
2012).
127. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
128. MO. ANN. STAT. §565.090 (West 2013).
129. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449.
130. Grossman, supra note 50.
131. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
132. Id. at 576.
133. Id.
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went on to compare these social media platforms to bulletin
boards that the victim had the option of reading.134 The court
was extremely concerned about prohibiting private individuals
from using social media to criticize and disparage others,
especially public figures.135
One take away from Cassidy is that prosecutors and
legislators will have a more difficult time preventing
harassment via a public forum like Twitter or a blog post as
opposed to harassment via a telephone call, letter, or email.
Put differently, one-to-many speech, which generally
encompasses social media, is going to face tougher
constitutional scrutiny than one-to-one speech like a telephone
call, letter, or email.
Due to time and space limitations, this article cannot offer
a complete analysis of all the challenges facing those tasked
with preventing and prosecuting social media related criminal
activity. However, that was not the purpose of the article.
Instead, the intent was merely to offer a brief snapshot of some
of the major concerns that have arisen in this area of law.
As the cases and prior discussion demonstrate, stopping
social media related crimes is no easy task. In fact, it appears,
at present, that criminal defendants have the upper hand.
Fortunately, this advantage will most likely be short-lived.
This is because law enforcement has been steadily adapting to
the Digital Age and incorporating social media into every
aspect of policing. For example, agencies from the New York
City Police Department to the Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission have established their very own
social media units or dedicated personnel to investigate and
monitor social media.136
Furthermore, legislators and prosecutors are now taking
proactive steps to prevent criminal defendants from exploiting
social media for criminal purposes. By way of example, several

134. Id.
135. Id. at 581.
136. Leslie Horn, NYPD Social Media Unit Goes After Criminals Online,
PC
(Aug.
10,
2011,
6:05
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2390857,00.asp; See JOHN BROWNING,
A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA’S
IMPACT ON THE LAW (Eddie Fournier ed., 2010).
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states have passed laws banning certain criminal defendants
from social media.137 Also, many prosecutors are now routinely
using social media in their cases. According to one Los Angeles
district attorney, “the first thing I do when I get a case is to
Google the victim, the suspect, and all the material witnesses. I
run them all through Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, YouTube
and see what I might get.”138

137. Jonathon Hitz, Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook: The
Freedom of Speech Implications of Banning Sex Offenders from Facebook, 89
IND. L.J. 1327 (2014).
138. Robin Sax, Watch What You Say . . . Online, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 19, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robin-sax/watchwhat-you-say-online_b_217366.html.
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